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Abstract 
We investigate whether a higher financial integration with the rest of the world can help the African 
countries reduce their production inefficiency and/or push up their efficient frontier of production. We 
use two alternative empirical approaches based, respectively, on a stochastic frontier analysis and 
quantile regressions. We provide evidence of heterogeneous situations across countries and time. This 
paper proposes a new approach for defining, at the aggregate level, a link between financial openness 
and production efficiency. We show that one size does not fit all: international financial integration 
can increase or decrease African countries' standard of living.  
 
 
Keywords: African countries, Financial openness, Stochastic frontier, Quantile regression.  
JEL Classification: F33, F34, F36, F41.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work was supported by French National Research Agency Grant ANR-17-EURE-0020 and Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science Kakenhi Grant number 19K01770.  
 
 
 
                             
1 Aix-Marseille Univ. CNRS, EHESS, Centale Marseille, IRD, AMSE, Marseille, France and CEPII 
Email: gilles.dufrenot@univ-amu.fr.  
2 Konan University (Hirao School of Management), Japan. Email: kimiko@konan-u.ac.jp 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper proposes an alternative view on the way we analyze the effects of financial integration 
on GDP per-capita in Africa. The papers traditionally focus on the effects on growth. However, higher 
growth rates do not necessarily have potential for reducing poverty. As shown in Figure A1 (World 
bank, 2018), many least developed countries recorded a positive growth rate in the last decade, but 
few of them have achieved the SDG (Sustainable Development Goal 8.1) target of 7% growth per year. 
Moreover, their GDP per-capita growths are clearly smaller than their economic growth. Even in the 
case of a virtuous circle in the financial integration/growth link, GDP per-capita can remain low 
relative to the level it could potentially reach. Thus, this paper investigates whether financial 
integration can help the African countries reach a higher level of GDP per-capita that corresponds to 
a more efficient production level. “Financial integration” is normally a phenomenon in which a 
country’s financial market is closely linked to global or regional markets, induced by increasing cross-
border capital flows as a form of foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment and foreign 
claims. However, the role of external financing in Africa is not same as that of other regions because 
many of developing African countries receive also foreign aid and remittances. Thus, in our paper, 
financial integration is interpreted in a broader sense as a phenomenon induced by private capital 
inflows, aids, and remittances. Our concept of efficiency relates to production frontier which is usually 
considered in the microeconomic literature and that we apply here to a macroeconomic context. The 
questions examined here are the following. Does financial integration matter to enhance the African 
countries’ boundaries of aggregate production performance? Is international financial integration a 
barrier that cannot be overlooked to scale-up production efficiency? To what extent does a facilitated 
access to international financial markets induce gains from reducing production gap inefficiencies?  
Why does this paper focus on production efficiency? In the African countries, the growth rates 
are too volatile and subject to significant shifts over time. GDP per-capita provides a better indication 
of changes occurring in a country’s standard of living (which is the key issue when countries are poor). 
From this standpoint, the outer limit of GDP per-capita can be considered as a proxy of the 
“macroeconomic” production frontier. This frontier is a structural indicator of how well a country is 
doing in elevating its standard of living. 
The microeconomic works show that capital inflows promote higher productivity gains through 
a variety of channels: intra and inter-sectoral diffusion effects, imitation effects favoring incremental 
innovations, learning by doing (see, for example, Newman et al., 2015; Moran, 2011). In terms of 
efficiency, at the macroeconomic level, financial integration can promote a higher GDP per-capita in 
several ways. First, FDI can improve companies’ know-how when they are carried out in the form of 
joint-ventures. Second, official development assistance (ODA, public transfers received from bilateral 
and multilateral donors) often include a technical assistance component leading to share experiences 
based on best practices. Third, remittances are used to pay for access to health or education, thereby 
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paving the way to an improvement of human capital and increasing total factor productivity. Thus, the 
production efficiency approach is a good way of capturing the compositional effects of productivity 
changes at the aggregate level.  
Meanwhile, an increasing reliance on foreign capital can also reduce production efficiency. For 
instance, this happens when portfolio investment inflows outstrip the need of the real sector and result 
in negative externalities in terms of misallocation of resources (superfluous investment). Large flows 
of capital from foreign banks can surpass the optimal level of credit needed for production. FDI 
inflows can lead to crowding-out effects, if investments take place in sectors with rent-seeking 
activities (for example, in case of important natural and mineral resources). An increase in the share 
of foreign banks’ assets out of total bank assets can strengthen the segmentation of credit markets, for 
example by facilitating the financing of companies already working with foreign partners to the 
detriment of local firms producing only for the domestic sector. 
Since the literature traditionally focuses on growth, not much is known about the financial 
integration/production efficiency link. Our paper tries to fill this gap. To the best of our knowledge, 
no existing empirical research has examined this question in a macro-perspective for the African 
countries. Our proposed estimates aim to test two hypotheses. First, we investigate whether a higher 
financial integration shifts the economies’ production frontier. Secondly, given their optimal frontier, 
we examine whether a higher financial integration helps the countries to close the gap to the frontier 
or equivalently to reduce the inefficiency scores. We propose estimates that allows for heterogeneous 
financial openness-production frontier nexus across countries, working with a panel of 45 African 
countries over the period 1996-2014. Our modeling strategy consists in the following steps.  
We first explore which subsets of explanatory variables have significant effects on GDP per-
capita (excluding the financial integration variables). In addition to physical capital, employment and 
human capital which are the basic inputs for production, there are many other potential explanatory 
variables that can affect the level of GDP per-capita (policy variables, institutional and governance 
variables, trade openness, terms of trade shocks, etc.) This raises a problem referred to as “model 
uncertainty” in the literature, meaning that the number of explanatory variables to select is not 
predefined. Further, the number of regressions with different combinations of explanatory variables is 
very high. To deal with this problem, we consider a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) technique. 
This tool has been widely used in the literature on growth empirics, but can also be used when the 
independent variable is the level of GDP (per-capita). Instead of the usual BMA techniques, we prefer 
the generalized BMA technique where a distinction is made between the focus variables (here the 
basic determinants of production like capital, labor and human capital) and the auxiliary variables (the 
other explanatory variables subject to uncertainty). Further, rather than the standard sequential 
approach based on pretest estimators, we consider the more robust one-step approach based on the 
Weighted Average Least-Squares (WALS) estimator. This first step of selecting the appropriate 
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potential determinants of GDP level is important to avoid omission bias in the production efficiency 
analysis. We find that GDP per-capita is significantly influenced by the sectoral composition of the 
GDP, demographic variables, policy variables and a few governance variables.  
In a second step, we investigate the effect of financial integration on GDP using stochastic frontier 
models. Our benchmark model is a neoclassical linearized Cobb-Douglas equation with physical 
capital, employment and human capital as the basic inputs. The residual is defined as the sum of an 
error term plus an additional term that measures the shortfall from maximal GDP dictated by the 
explanatory variables (inefficiency term). We explore the relative importance of the non-financial 
variables and financial integration variables in reducing or increasing the inefficiency component of 
the residuals. This means that GDP inefficiency is assumed to change across time and countries 
according to the non-financial and financial integration variables. An alternative assumption, also 
investigated in the paper, is that financial integration can shift the production frontier itself. To explore 
this, we compare the frontiers obtained with and without the financial integration variables.  
Our results show evidence of a systematic positive effect of international financial integration on 
GDP per-capita efficiency scores. First, very few financial integration variables exert an influence on 
the inefficiency gap. In a majority of countries, FDI inflows contribute to reduce inefficiency, but this 
positive effect is not shown in the poverty indicators. Second, portfolio equity/debt liabilities together 
with FDI liabilities drive the production frontiers upward. However, there is a high dispersion across 
countries. Easing the mobilization of international financial flows does not always strengthen a 
country’s capacity to use a more efficient production technology leading a higher GDP per-capita. 
They play against the dominant view that one size fits all. Policymakers cannot draw on the experience 
of their peers because close financial integration with the rest of the world can be harmful and a 
hindrance to increase real incomes. The observed heterogeneity in the financial integration/GDP 
efficiency links also implies that policymakers might be more cautious in moving further to achieve 
regional financial integration within Africa.  
In a third step, we attempt to understand the observed heterogeneity across countries in terms of 
production efficiency behaviors. Production relationships (captured here by the vector of coefficients 
of the explanatory variables) are likely to vary at different levels of efficiencies. Maybe the countries 
with the highest efficiency scores make a better combination of “financial integration” with the other 
determinants of GDP than those with lower efficiency rates. One way of investigating this is to allow 
parameter heterogeneity in the GDP per-capita equation (which is not possible with the SPF approach). 
Quantile estimators thus provide us with a complete characterization of the conditional distribution of 
the frontier because they are robust to outliers in a panel data context. We find that ODA is the financial 
integration that does not help the countries catching-up with the most efficient ones - in terms of 
reaching the highest GDP per-capita. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents recent trends on 
international financial integration in the African countries. Section 3 presents an analysis of the 
selection of potential determinants of GDP per-capita in Africa. Section 4 contains the stochastic 
frontier analysis. In Section 5, we present the results based on panel quantile regression. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Financial globalization and standard of living in Africa: a puzzle 
The traditional view of international financial integration in Africa is that it is weak, compared 
to other emerging countries in Asia or Latin America. The reasons are twofold. First, the level of 
financial markets development is still weak. This retards financial integration because of the lower 
performance of commercial banks and financial companies (Lensik and Meesters, 2014) and the 
weaker absorptive capacity of financial innovations (Ahmed and Mmolainyane, 2014, provide an 
example for Botswana). Second, financial markets are still fragmented because banks and financial 
institutions operate in oligopolistic markets. This does not facilitate access to credit (Beck and 
Honohan, 2008).  
However, there is evidence that international financial inflows and cross-border financial 
transactions have strongly increased since the beginning 2000s. Recent research emphasize that 
financial globalization has good implications in terms of boosting the productivity in the 
manufacturing sector (see Okafor et al., 2017) and of favoring the adoption of reforms leading to 
higher macro-financial stability (Lane, 2016).  
When we look at the composition of inflows (Figure 1 from the African Economic Outlook 2015) 
we see the growing importance of private capital flows, such as FDI, portfolio investments and 
remittances, but a decline in ODA. FDI (73.5 billion US dollars in 2015) increased five-fold between 
2000 and 2012, becoming an important source of investment for Africa and accounting for roughly 
20% of the gross fixed capital in this region.  
Though the steep increase in FDIs was mainly caused by upsurges in raw materials (in 23 
resource-producing countries they account for 70% of the overall FDIs), they began to diversify away 
from mineral resources to consumer goods and services. Furthermore, in addition to providing tied aid, 
donor countries are contributing to economic cooperation offered through trade and investment with 
emphasis placed on efficiency. As a result, between 2007 and 2009, a shift from aid to investment 
became clear, with the total value of external financial flows into Africa in the form of FDIs exceeding 
the total value of ODA. 
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Figure1: External financial flows to Africa, 2000-2014 
  
 
Did higher international financial integration lead to higher standards of living? For purpose of 
illustration, we plot some graphs showing the correlation between two indicators of poverty and 
external liabilities (Figure 2). We consider a multidimensional poverty index (MDPI), taken from the 
UNDP database 2018. They are calculated for a group of 45 countries (see the list in Table A1). The 
MDPI measures the percentage of people that is multi-dimensionally poor (adjusted by the intensity 
of deprivation). This can be regarded as an indicator of the standard of living in terms of deprivation 
and includes several dimensions (income, low education, bad quality of works, bad housing conditions, 
social exclusion, etc.) The financial integration variables are the FDI, portfolio equity/debt liabilities, 
foreign claims, remittances, ODA and disbursements (all measured as share of GDP or GNI). We 
compute their average over the whole period. 
Figure 2 shows that private capital inflows like FDI, portfolio equity/debt liabilities, foreign 
claims, and remittances appear to be negatively correlated with MDPI, suggesting that the financial 
integration seems to promote rising standards of living (namely, decreasing the MDPI) in the African 
countries. However, if we include a few outlier countries, this correlation is confirmed but weakly, 
because the relationship between financial integration and MDPI varies widely among countries. On 
the other hand, the public capital inflows like ODA and disbursements are positively correlated with 
it. Increasing poverty needs the external aids, which may be a reason of the positive correlation 
although we cannot understand the causality of this relationship at this stage. Traditionally, 
international financial integration has been a good thing to reduce poverty and raise the standard of 
living in the poor countries. The examples usually evoked are China and India. When the focus is on 
Africa, the results seem quite different. Though financial integration may have contributed to higher 
growth rates, the latter did not prevent the number of poor people from rising.  
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Figure 2: Financial integration and standards of living during 2006-2016 
 
 
The decline in standards of living can be analyzed as the result of lower potential GDP per-capita. 
Indeed, the positive effects of financial integration are channeled by “supply-side” factors. For 
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instance, an increase in foreign capital inflows is expected to build up countries’' productive capacity 
(through an increase in capital stock and human capital skills, an improvement of the structural 
transformation from agriculture-intensive to industry-intensive activities). This boosts potential GDP 
and therefore rises the standards of living. Moreover, international financial integration improves 
potential GDP through an increase in the number of firms that better perform because the access to 
credit is facilitated (higher market liquidity, lower premium than in domestic financial markets, lower 
barriers to entry). In section 4 and 5, we examine whether the international financial integration 
increased or reduced potential GDP per-capita in Africa (using production frontier as a proxy).  
 
3. Selecting the potential determinants of the level of GDP per-capita 
3.1. Specification of the empirical model 
As a first step, we want to find a benchmark specification in which some basic determinants of 
GDP per-capita can be selected as potential explanatory variables that will be used in the next sections 
in frontier analyses.  
The theoretical background underlying our econometric specification is based on three strands of 
the literature accounting for income differentials across countries. 
One belongs to the tradition of the Neoclassical growth model. In the medium-to-long run, GDP 
per-capita is a function of physical capital, human capital, labor (employment, hours worked, working-
aged population) and total factor productivity (TFP). In the next section, we shall measure TFP using 
production efficiency as a proxy.  
Secondly, we also consider the literature on structural transformation. It belongs to the field of 
development economics and has its root in the seminal works of Lewis. Structural transformation is 
viewed as a way of upgrading an economy to higher productive activities. The process of 
transformation occurs by changes in the sectoral composition of the GDP, the improvement in trade 
structure, competitiveness, or more intensive modes of production (see, among others, Bah, 2011; 
Barrett et al., 2017; Duarte and Restruccia, 2010; Hausmann, et al. 2011; Herrendorf et al., 2015; 
Hidalgo et al., 2007; and Lin, 2012). 
A third strand of the literature identifies developmental governance as a key factor for successful 
economic transformation. This refers to political governance strategies, good practices in 
administration for development, economic policy reforms (see Carraro and Karfakis, 2018; Mensah et 
al., 2016; and Mijiyawa, 2017).  
Against this background, our specification is the following 
𝑦 𝛼 𝑋 β 𝑍 γ 𝜖  ,    𝑖 1, ⋯ , 𝑁, 𝑡 1, ⋯ , 𝑇,                      (1) 
where the error term 𝜖 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 0, 𝜎 . Each variable is defined for country 𝑖 and year 𝑡. The 
level of GDP per-capita, 𝑦  (GDP divided by total population) is regressed on three basic 
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determinants of production that are in the vector 𝑋 : the stock of physical capital per-capita, the ratio 
of total employment over total population and human capital (there are no data on the number of hours 
worked, so we use the years of schooling as a proxy). In the vector 𝑍 , we consider the following 
potential determinants of GDP (see the list in Table A2): 
 
(1) Sectoral structure of the economy: shares of agriculture, industry and services in total GDP; 
(2) Demographic factor: working-aged population; 
(3) Policy variables: inflation, fiscal balance, trade openness, terms of trade,  
(4) Financial development: changes in the share of credit out of total GDP, mobile cellular 
subscriptions (per 100 people); 
(5) Governance and institutional variables: voice accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law, control of corruption.  
 
The variables in 𝑦  and 𝑋  are measured in log. In the vector 𝑍 , the following variables 
are log transformed: terms of trade and working-aged population. 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 are real parameters to be 
estimated. 
 
3.2. Estimation and data 
We estimate Equation (1) using a model-average approach. We compare two estimators: a 
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) and Weighted Average Least Squares (WALS)3.  
In Equation (1), 𝑋  contains the so-called “focus” variables (those we absolutely want in the 
model) and the vector 𝑍  represents the “auxiliary” variables (those which are subject to uncertainty). 
Since the number of variables in 𝑍  is 16, the number of regressions with different subsets of 
combination of the auxiliary variables is 216=65536. Non informative priors are used for 𝑋  and a 
multivariate Gaussian prior is used for 𝑍 .  
For the BMA estimator, the final solution of the variables is based on the posterior inclusion 
probability (PIP). A variable in 𝑍  is considered to be significantly correlated with the level of GDP 
per-capita if the PIP is above the 0.8 threshold. The WALS estimator uses a preliminary orthogonal 
transformation of the data to ensure that the estimates are invariant to scale transformation and to 
improve accuracy of the estimator. The selection of the variables that are significantly linked to 𝑦  
is based on the t-ratio.  
We consider 45 African countries over the period 1996-2014 (see Table A1 in Appendix). The 
choice of countries and years is dictated by the availability of data. Tables A2 in Appendix contains a 
detailed presentation of the data. We consider several sources. The basic determinants of GDP are 
taken from Penn World Table version 2.9 where data on real GDP, capital, employment, human capital 
                             
3 For a detailed presentation of these estimators, see De Luca and Magnus (2011 and 2016).  
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are available for many countries in the world. We also collect data on terms of trade and trade openness. 
Macroeconomic policy variables, financial development variables, and governance indicators are 
taken from the World Development Indicators, the World Economic Outlook and the World 
Governance Indicators.  
 
3.3. Results 
Table 1 shows the regression coefficients, their standard error and the posterior probability 
inclusion (PIP) for the BMA estimator. We also report the results of the WALS estimator (estimated 
coefficient, their standard error, and t-ratio in the last three columns). 
The PIP of the focus variables equals 1 because they are constrained to be in the list of explanatory 
variables in each regression. Physical capital and employment have the strongest effect on the level of 
GDP per-capita. A percentage increase in capital (per-capita) increases the probability that GDP per-
capita ends by 0.41%, while a percentage increase in the employment-to-population ratio raises the 
probability of 0.49% decrease in the level of GDP per-capita. This explanatory variable is a good 
proxy to capture the capability of countries to create jobs that lead an increase in the level of GDP per-
capita. A positive coefficient would signal a demographic dividend. Here, the negative sign suggests 
that, on average, the African countries still lack the positive effects of a rapidly growing population 
reflected by high dependency ratios (high percentage of dependent people aged 0 to 15). This is 
confirmed by the negative coefficient of the working-aged population.  
Among the auxiliary variables, we find only but a few that are significantly correlated with the 
level of GDP per-capita. Among the sectoral structure variables, the share of industry has a positive 
effect on the level of GDP per-capita. The industrialization contributes to increasing the standard of 
living. Among the policy variables, the terms of trade are associated with lower GDP per-capita, 
thereby suggesting a vulnerability to external shocks. Inflation also affects the GDP per-capita 
negatively. Among the financial development variables, mobile cellular subscriptions used as a proxy 
of mobile banking penetration are positively correlated with the level of GDP per-capita. Very few 
governance and institutional variables have an effective influence on the level of GDP per-capita 
(government effectiveness and to a lesser extent regulation quality).  
The last two columns with the WALS estimator confirm these findings. 
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Table 1. BMA and WALS estimates 
 
 
4．Stochastic frontier analysis 
The frontier approach is an alternative approach to the usual accounting decomposition of growth 
to measure the potential GDP level of a country. In this section, we argue that one reason why we may 
find little evidence of a correlation between international financial integration and potential GDP can 
be explained by the heterogeneity of the finance/GDP link across the African countries and across 
time. Higher inflows of capital reduce production inefficiency in some countries but increase it in 
other countries. 
We investigate the role of financial integration variables in increasing GDP per-capita by 
examining two issues. One question is whether financial integration reduces the countries’ distance to 
their GDP frontier. By analyzing changes towards the production frontier in section 4.1, we question 
Coef. Std. Err. PIP Coef. Std. Err. t-ratio
Focus variables
Intercept 4.467 0.22 1.00 4.20 0.22 19.01
Capital 0.409 0.01 1.00 0.43 0.01 29.15
Employment -0.490 0.03 1.00 -0.51 0.03 -18.20
Human capital 0.075 0.04 1.00 0.11 0.04 2.52
Auxiliary variables
Share (agriculture) 0.118 0.17 0.37 0.27 0.14 1.88
Share (industry) 0.795 0.15 1.00 0.76 0.14 5.55
Working-aged -1.115 0.11 1.00 -1.10 0.11 -10.13
Inflation -0.284 0.06 1.00 -0.23 0.06 -4.21
Fiscal balance 0.007 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.73
Trade openness -0.015 0.04 0.14 -0.05 0.06 -0.75
Terms of trade -0.844 0.12 1.00 -0.78 0.12 -6.28
Domestic credit -0.006 0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.93
Mobile subscription 0.003 0.0004 1.00 0.003 0.0004 7.25
Voice and accountability -0.006 0.02 0.13 -0.03 0.03 -1.02
Political stability 0.0003 0.005 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.63
Governance effectiveness 0.327 0.05 1.00 0.30 0.05 5.67
Regulation quality 0.013 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.05 2.07
Rule of law -0.017 0.04 0.21 -0.08 0.05 -1.46
Control of corruption -0.003 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.42
BMA WALS
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the capability of countries to reduce their inefficiency scores through a higher integration with the 
international financial markets. A second issue is whether financial globalization can help pushing the 
frontiers. This is important in a perspective of catching up with other countries in the world with higher 
levels of GDP per-capita. We compare the frontiers with or without financial integration variables in 
section 4.2. 
Before going to the next section, we refer to the choice of the financial integration variables. 
Several indicators of financial integration have been proposed in the literature (for a survey, see Billio 
et al., 2017). Price-based indicators assume the law of one price when markets are integrated. We do 
not consider such indicators here because the asset market prices in Africa contain unobservable 
components related to liquidity risk premium which are difficult to measure. Other indicators are based 
on the correlation between saving and investment across countries. In integrated markets, firms easily 
receive loans from international capital market. This implies a weak correlation between domestic 
investment and saving (this is known as the Feldstein/Horioka hypothesis). We do neither consider 
this type of indicators for two reasons. Firstly, the Feldstein/Horioka hypothesis is based on the 
condition of real interest rate parity, which is not satisfied for many African countries. Secondly, 
investment and saving are endogenous. In the regressions, the variables in the vector 𝑍  are assumed 
to be weakly exogenous with respect to the set of coefficients of financial integration variables. 
Our motivation is to consider various types of indicators reflecting the financial dependence of 
the African countries vis-à-vis the international capital markets: inter-banks loans and portfolio 
investment, international financial liabilities in equity and debt markets, indicators of capital account 
liberalization (inflows of foreign direct investment), remittance, and disbursements of foreign official 
transfers. So, we consider the following indicators of financial integration (the sources of data are 
presented in Table A2):  
 
(1) FDI liabilities (stock) as share of GDP, 
(2) Portfolio equity liabilities (stock) as share of GDP, 
(3) Portfolio debt liabilities (stock) as share of GDP, 
(4) Consolidated foreign claims of BIS reporting banks to GDP, 
(5) Personal remittances received as share of GDP,  
(6) Net ODA received as share of GNI,  
(7) Disbursements on external debt (long-term + IMF disbursements) as share of GNI. 
 
The choice of countries and years is dictated by the availability of data. So, we use panel data for 45 
countries in case of (1) FDI, (4) foreign claims, and (6) ODA; for 44 countries except Seychelles in 
case of (7) disbursements; for 42 countries except Central African Republic, Chad, and Mauritania in 
case of (5) remittances; and for 37 countries except Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
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Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Rwanda in case of (2) portfolio equities and (3) 
portfolio debts. 
    Table 2 shows the optimal lag, z-bar tilde statistics and p-values of Granger non-causality test 
between GDP per-capita (y) and financial integration variable (FI) in heterogeneous panel by 
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). The optimal lags are determined based on the Bayesian information 
criteria. At 5% level of significance, the null hypothesis (FI does not Granger-cause y) can be rejected 
in case of FDI and portfolio equity investment, while the reverse null hypothesis (y does not Granger-
cause FI) can be rejected in case of portfolio debt investment, foreign claims, ODA and disbursements. 
Thus, FDI and portfolio equity investment seem to have unidirectional causal relationship from FI to 
y, while portfolio debt investment, foreign claims, ODA and disbursements have unidirectional reverse 
causal relationship from y to FI. However, remittance does not have any causal relationship with y.   
   
Table 2. Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) Granger non-causality test results 
 
 
4.1. The role of financial integration in reducing the distance to the frontier 
We start with the following production frontier equation: 
𝑦 𝛼 𝑋 β 𝑣 𝑢  ,    𝑖 1, ⋯ ,45, 𝑡 1996, ⋯ ,2014,                (2) 
where 𝑦 log(GDP per-capita) in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝛼  is a country fixed effect, 𝑋  is the 
vector of the basic determinants of production: log(physical capital/population), 
log(employment/population) and human capital. 𝑢  is the (non-negative) inefficiency variable that 
measures the distance from the maximum level of GDP per-capita. It follows a truncated-Normal 
distribution 𝑁 𝜇 , 𝜎 . 𝑣 𝑁 0, 𝜎  is the error term. We assume that 𝑢 ⊥ 𝑋 , 𝑣 . 
Let us define 𝑍  the vector of the auxiliary variables selected in the BMA and WALS analyses: 
share of industry in GDP, working-aged population, inflation, terms of trade, mobile subscription, and 
government effectiveness. Define 𝐹𝐼  as the vector of financial integration variables. Assuming that 
FI variables optimal lag z-bar tilde p-value optimal lag z-bar tilde p-value
FDI 1 11.45 0.00 1 7.05 0.06
Portfolio equities 1 4.24 0.03 1 5.37 0.07
Portfolio debts 1 3.18 0.10 4 6.03 0.00
Folaign claims 1 2.89 0.14 1 7.68 0.01
Remittances 1 2.57 0.16 1 5.83 0.12
ODA 1 2.69 0.11 1 10.78 0.00
Disbursements 1 0.65 0.60 1 7.46 0.01
 Note: Bayesian Information criteria. P-values are computed using 100 bootstrap replications.
H0: FI does not Granger-cause y H0: y does not Granger-cause FI
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the maximum level of GDP per-capita (the frontier) is dictated by 𝑋 , the vector 𝑍  and 𝐹𝐼  enter 
as explanatory variables of 𝜇 :  
𝜇 𝑘 𝑘 𝑍 𝑘 𝐹𝐼 .                                                (3) 
We want to know whether the inefficiency term diminishes (or increases) when countries become 
more financially integrated with the international markets. This amounts to comparing 𝜇  when 
𝑘 0 and when 𝑘 0. In this section, it is not necessary to consider whether financial integration 
variables with the reverse causality (y → 𝐹𝐼 ) or without causality (y ↮ 𝐹𝐼 ) can be included as 
explanatory variables of 𝜇  in equation (3).   
Equation (2) with (3) are estimated following the methodology proposed by Greene (2005a, 
2005b), based a robust way to deal with the incidental parameter problem due to unmeasured 
heterogeneity in the individual fixed effect coefficients. We also compute the inefficiency parameter 
𝜆 𝜎 𝜎⁄ . A significant  𝜆  indicates skewness of the distribution. The individual and mean 
inefficiencies are estimated using Jondrow et al. (1982)’s formula.  
In Tables 3, we report the estimation of Equations (2) and (3) when 𝑘 0 (model with no-
financial variables) and when 𝑘 0 (models with the financial integration variables included one 
by one). The basic determinants of production have significant coefficients in all regressions. Physical 
capital and human capital both contribute positively to the increase in GDP per-capita, while the ratio 
of employed people in total population has a negative effect.  
    Through the different regressions, we see that some auxiliary non-financial variables influence 
production inefficiencies. An increase in terms of trade, government effectiveness and mobile 
subscription reduces the inefficiency. Conversely, an increase in the share of industry increases 
inefficiency. The working-aged population and policy variables that are usually found in the literature 
to exert an effect on GDP growth such as inflation are not robust determinants of any improvement or 
deterioration in efficiency. 
Turning to the financial integration variables, we find several interesting results. Firstly, the 
regressions show that only FDI liability stock and remittances significantly influence efficiency. FDI 
increases inefficiency, but the remittance reduces the inefficiency. Plots of the marginal effects of both 
variables across time and countries are shown respectively in Figure 3. The marginal effects are 
computed using Wang (2002)’s approach. They are based on the post-truncation mean of 𝑢 . 
Denoting Ω 𝑒 , 𝑍 , 𝐹𝐼 , where 𝑒  is a vector of 1 and Ω  the 𝑙  element of Ω  
and 𝑘 the coefficient associated to this variable, we have 
        𝑘 1 ∇
∇
∇
∇
∇
,                                       
where ∇ 𝜇 𝜎 , 𝐸 𝑢 𝜎 ∇ 𝜙 ∇ Φ ∇⁄ , 𝜙 and Φ denote the Normal density and 
distribution function, respectively.  
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Table 3. Estimation results of Equations 
 
 
 
No fi. integration Financial integration 
Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio
Frontier
Capital 0.29 *** 17.68 0.30 *** 17.79 0.39 *** 20.74 0.40 *** 19.99 0.36 *** 20.36
Employment -0.50 *** -20.1 -0.50 *** -20.24 -0.66 *** -23.86 -0.68 *** -23.34 -0.62 *** -24.23
Human capital 0.25 *** 5.4 0.26 *** 5.46 0.30 *** 5.99 0.32 *** 6.01 0.36 *** 7.39
Inefficiency
 Non-financial variables
Industry share 2.43 *** 3.48 2.26 *** 3.52 1.55 *** 4.45 1.26 ** 2.10 3.38 *** 2.37
Working aged 0.01 0.01 -0.18 -0.25 0.46 0.84 0.46 0.54 1.85 1.28
Inflation 0.19 1.48 0.18 1.46 0.24 ** 2.46 0.36 *** 2.67 0.57 *** 2.39
Terms of trade -1.53 ** -2.11 -1.36 ** -2.00 -0.62 -1.28 -2.07 ** -2.30 -3.52 ** -1.99
Governance effectiveness -1.20 *** -3.33 -1.22 *** -3.48 -1.75 *** -7.73 -2.10 *** -3.47 -2.60 *** -2.39
Mobile -0.05 *** -3.25 -0.05 *** -3.37
 Financial variables
FDI 0.23 *** 2.47
Portfolio equity -5.68 -1.60
Portfolio debt 0.57 0.58
Foreign claims -1.02 -0.89
σu 0.51 *** 6.54 0.50 *** 6.75 0.45 *** 15.32 0.53 *** 5.82 0.70 *** 4.43
σv 0.08 *** 15.36 0.08 *** 15.43 0.08 *** 14.39 0.08 *** 13.66 0.08 *** 15.11
λ 6.44 *** 80.95 6.22 *** 82.56 5.68 *** 177.76 6.35 *** 68.85 8.77 *** 55.44
Note: *, **, ***: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence 
Portfolio debtFDI Portfolio equity Foreign claims
No fi. integration Financial integration 
Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio
Frontier
Capital 0.29 *** 17.68 0.30 *** 17.63 0.30 *** 17.71 0.29 *** 17.76
Employment -0.50 *** -20.1 -0.50 *** -19.71 -0.50 *** -20.13 -0.49 *** -20.10
Human capital 0.25 *** 5.4 0.24 *** 4.90 0.25 *** 5.40 0.23 *** 4.96
Inefficiency
 Non-financial variables
Industry share 2.43 *** 3.48 1.35 *** 2.79 2.39 *** 3.49 2.73 *** 3.36
Working aged 0.01 0.01 -0.48 -0.76 -0.08 -0.11 0.47 0.58
Inflation 0.19 1.48 0.13 1.25 0.20 1.59 0.24 * 1.76
Terms of trade -1.53 ** -2.11 -1.72 *** -2.83 -1.69 ** -2.22 -1.55 ** -2.07
Governance effectiveness -1.20 *** -3.33 -1.01 *** -3.71 -1.18 *** -3.30 -1.22 *** -3.27
Mobile -0.05 *** -3.25 -0.04 *** -3.54 -0.05 *** -3.24 -0.05 *** -3.19
 Financial variables
Remittance -7.01 ** -2.38
ODA 0.65 0.92
Disbursement -2.45 -1.19
σu 0.51 *** 6.54 0.44 *** 7.23 0.51 *** 6.55 0.53 *** 6.42
σv 0.08 *** 15.36 0.08 *** 15.48 0.08 *** 15.37 0.08 *** 14.94
λ 6.44 *** 80.95 5.30 *** 84.33 6.38 *** 80.84 6.91 *** 82.68
Note: *, **, ***: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence 
Remittance ODA Disbursement
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Looking at the time averages in the left panel of Figure 3.1, the marginal effects associated with FDI 
stock liabilities seem to be positive. This illustrates the fact that, on average, FDI have been sources 
of higher under-performance, thereby implying an inefficient use of the basic and auxiliary factors of 
production under financial integration to reach the maximum level of GDP per-capita. However, the 
curve shows a decreasing trend, suggesting that the time inefficiency, conditioned by financial 
integration, has been decreasing over time. The right panel in Figure 3.1 indicates that the marginal 
effects associated with remittance seem to be negative. But the curve with an increasing trend shows 
that the time “efficiency”, conditioned by remittance, has been decreasing over time. The marginal 
effects across countries in Figure 3.2 in case of FDI indicate that Angola, Congo Democratic Republic, 
and Congo Republic are the outlier countries with highest under-performance. Even when these 3 
countries are omitted, the marginal effects of the other countries vary widely in magnitude. Recent 
trend of financial integration associated with FDI appears to have some positive effect to reduce the 
degree of under-performance, especially in emerging African countries such as the countries on the 
right side of Figure 3.2. In other words, one size does not fit all. 
 
Figure 3.1. Marginal effects across time, FDI (left panel) and remittances (right panel) 
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Figure 3.2．Marginal effects across countries, FDI 
 
Lastly, we measure the relative change in inefficiency by calculating the following difference 
        100 𝐸 𝑢 𝐹𝐼 , 𝑋 , 𝑍 𝐸 𝑢 𝑋 , 𝑍 /𝐸 𝑢 𝑋 , 𝑍 ,                
where 𝐸 𝑢 𝐹𝐼 , 𝑋 , 𝑍  and 𝐸 𝑢 𝑋 , 𝑍  are the estimates of inefficiencies computed 
using Jondrow et al. (1982)’s approach. We then compute the time and country averages. 
Looking first at country averages, Figure 4.1 shows that inefficiency diminishes after a higher 
financial integration for FDI liabilities in a greater proportion of countries (36 out of 45 countries). 
However, there exists the heterogeneity in magnitude of these changes. Clearly, Mauritius remains an 
outlier in the change in inefficiency. In Mauritius, FDI liabilities as a share of GDP increased by about 
200 times after the global financial crisis, i.e., from average 12% (1996-2008) to average 2305% 
(2009-2014). Since Mauritius is regarded as a tax haven, one explanation of this inefficiency can be 
driven by the global liquidity poured into Mauritius over the post-crisis period. Thus, we calculate the 
time averages with and without Mauritius when the financial integration occurs through FDI liabilities 
in the left panel of Figure 4.2. The time averages with Mauritius (blue line) show that inefficiency 
increases, especially during the post-crisis period as we expected. However, those without Mauritius 
(red dashed line) indicate that inefficiency increases especially since 2005, which may be caused by 
over-investments into Africa which price surges in raw materials attracted, and by weak absorptive 
capabilities. Conversely, the right panel in Figure 4.2 indicates that remittance has been a source of 
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improvement of technical efficiency over the whole period. The positive effect of remittance on 
technical efficiency are large over the period before the global financial crisis, but decreasing after the 
crisis.  
 
Figure 4.1. Changes in inefficiency across countries, FDI 
Figure 4.2. Changes in inefficiency across time, FDI (left panel) and remittance (right panel) 
 
4.2. The role of financial integration in pushing the frontier 
This section investigates the role of financial integration in moving the frontier, then the vector 
𝑍  play the same role as the vector 𝑋  in Equation (2). In this case, we compare two models:  
𝑦 𝛼 𝑋 β 𝑍 γ 𝑣 𝑢  ,                                         (4) 
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𝑦 𝛼 𝑋 β 𝑍 γ 𝐹𝐼 δ 𝑣 𝑢  ,                                  (5) 
where 𝑦 log(GDP per-capita) in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝛼  is a country fixed effect, 𝑋  is the 
vector of the basic determinants of production. 𝑢  is the inefficiency variable that measures the 
distance from the maximum level of GDP per-capita. It follows a truncated-Normal distribution  
𝑢 𝑁 𝜇, 𝜎 . We assume that 𝑢 ⊥ 𝑋 , 𝑍 ,  𝐹𝐼 ,  𝑣 . 𝑣 𝑁 0, 𝜎  is the error term. 
We use the fixed-effects stochastic frontier models by Belotti and Ilardi (2018). 
In Equation (4), the maximum level of GDP per-capita depends upon both 𝑋  and 𝑍 . In 
Equation (5), the frontier moves when, in addition to 𝑋  and 𝑍 , the financial integration variables 
𝐹𝐼  are included in the list of explanatory variables. Among financial integration variables, shown 
by the Granger non-causality tests in Table 2, FDI and portfolio equity investment have unidirectional 
causal relationship (𝐹𝐼 → y). So, we can use the fixed-effects stochastic frontier model with FDI and 
portfolio equity investment as financial integration variables (included one by one). Since remittance 
does not have any causal relationship (y ↮ 𝐹𝐼), we cannot use it as financial integration variable. 
Portfolio debt investment, foreign claims, ODA and disbursements have unidirectional reverse causal 
relationship (y → 𝐹𝐼 ), which requires the instrumental variable. In the first stage, the financial 
integration variable, 𝐹𝐼 , is regressed on the instrumental variables. As the candidates of instrumental 
variables, we use auxiliary variables which are not correlated with y (level of GDP per capita) in 
Table 1. In the second stage, we use the fixed-effects stochastic frontier model with the predicted 
values, 𝐹𝐼 , obtained from first regression in place of 𝐹𝐼 .  
We now assess the marginal contribution of the financial integration variables to the maximum 
GDP per-capita amount. We investigate whether countries perform better when they are more 
financially integrated with the rest of the world. To this end, we examine the difference between the 
frontier estimated when δ 0 in Equation (5) from the efficiency level of GDP obtained under the 
constraint δ 0 in Equation (4). The estimated coefficients of Equation (4) and (5) are shown in 
Table 4. When the auxiliary variables dictate the frontier, together with the basic factors of production 
(when they are not determinants of the inefficiency term), inflation, governance effectiveness, and 
mobile subscription are the three variables that carry statistically significant coefficients. 
Unsurprisingly, inflation negatively affects the efficient level of GDP per-capita, while the others 
affect positively. Amongst the financial integration variables, FDI liabilities, together with portfolio 
equity/debt liabilities have statistically significant effect on the efficient level of GDP per-capita. They 
are “pull factors” in the sense that they pull down the frontier, below the maximum level achieved 
when δ 0. 
   We graphically show the time average of frontiers estimated when δ 0 (dotted curve) and those 
computed when δ 0 (the financial variables are considered one by one) in Figure 5. The curves 
indicate that, portfolio equity/debt liabilities together with FDI liabilities, drive the efficient frontier 
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up. Moreover, short-term private capital (portfolio equities and debts) contributes more to moving the 
frontier upward than long-term one (FDI), although we have to focus on the difference of the member 
countries, i.e., the former includes the relatively advanced 37 countries and the latter 45, respectively. 
By contrast, foreign bank claims, ODA, and disbursements lead to a retrenchment of efficient 
production. One implication for economic policy is that private financial investments in the economies 
are better for production efficiency than public transfers. One explanation of the negative effect of 
debt issuance through foreign banks’ loans can be that the drivers of capital flows to the economic 
sectors are missing. 
 
Table 4. Estimation results of Equation (4) and (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No fi. integration Financial integration 
Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio Coef. z-ratio
Frontier
Capital 0.33 *** 3.67 0.33 *** 3.69 0.35 *** 3.46 0.35 *** 3.49 0.33 *** 3.63 0.33 *** 3.50 0.33 *** 3.69
Employment -0.55 *** -3.65 -0.55 *** -3.69 -0.58 *** -3.44 -0.57 *** -3.36 -0.55 *** -3.57 -0.55 *** -3.58 -0.55 *** -3.62
Human capital 0.19 1.23 0.19 1.26 0.20 1.24 0.18 1.26 0.19 1.23 0.19 1.22 0.18 1.18
Industry share 0.37 0.89 0.36 0.87 0.41 0.96 0.39 0.89 0.35 0.83 0.27 0.61 0.37 0.84
Working aged 0.15 0.40 0.19 0.50 0.23 0.62 0.09 0.22 0.15 0.40 0.17 0.45 0.17 0.48
Inflation -0.25 *** -6.75 -0.25 *** -6.81 -0.25 *** -8.30 -0.27 *** -7.87 -0.24 *** -6.49 -0.24 *** -6.71 -0.25 *** -6.67
Terms of trade 0.06 0.37 0.07 ** 0.41 0.10 0.46 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.37 0.08 0.44
Governance effectiveness 0.09 * 1.66 0.11 *** 1.98 0.18 *** 2.65 0.17 *** 2.74 0.09 1.58 0.08 1.35 0.10 * 1.71
Mobile 0.002 ** 2.30 0.002 *** 2.51 0.003 ** 2.55 0.003 *** 2.76 0.002 ** 2.32 0.002 ** 2.32 0.002 ** 2.27
 Financial variables
FDI -0.01 *** -3.57
Portfolio equity -0.19 *** -4.35
Portfolio debt -0.83 ** -2.01
Foreign claims -0.12 -0.37
ODA -2.27 -0.44
Disbursement -4.90 -1.49
λ 2.84 *** 2.59 2.83 *** 2.63 2.54 *** 2.66 2.61 *** 2.75 2.79 *** 2.53 2.80 *** 2.59 2.80 *** 2.46
Note: *, **, ***: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence 
Foreign claims ODA DisbursementFDI Portfolio equity Portfolio debt
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Figure 5: Frontiers with financial integration: push and pull factors across time 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the frontiers by countries. The dispersion of the different 
frontiers is low within each country, but there is a high dispersion across countries. The clustering of 
frontiers within each country suggests that the effects of financial integration in pushing up or down 
the frontier are incremental (not disruptive). The financial integration does not seem to change the 
distribution of GDP per-capita across countries. It is therefore not surprising that changes in the 
stochastic frontiers following higher financial integration does not impact the standard of living 
(measured here by the MDPI).  
For purpose of illustration, the top panels and bottom left panel in Figure 7 are scatter plots of 
frontiers estimated with FDI and portfolio equity/debt liabilities (horizontal axis) versus MDPI 
(vertical axis). Contrary to our expectations, the dots lines that match these plots have a negative slope, 
thereby suggesting that the way financial integration changes the production frontiers has some 
positive effect on the standard of living. By contrast, in the bottom right panel of the same figure, we 
see that the dots line seems to be horizontal (or the line up with slightly positive slope) when we report 
the differences in inefficiency scores on the horizontal axis. The bottom right panel suggests that 
financial integration through FDI does not have enough power to modify the distance to the frontier.  
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Figure 6: Frontiers with financial integration: push and pull factors across countries 
 
 
Figure 7: Frontiers and inefficiency score differences versus MDPI 
 
The horizontal dots line corresponding to FDI in the bottom right panel in Figure 7 can be 
interpreted in two ways. Firstly, a country that reduces its productive inefficiency by receiving 
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additional inflows of FDI does not manage to reduce multidimensional poverty. This happens for 
instance because FDI does not improve labor-intensive activities that should lead employment creation 
and eventually to poverty reduction. Moreover, equity market-driven production activities do not seem 
to trickle down to the poors. They target privileged groups of firms and households, without 
contributing to poverty alleviation. To say it differently, the efficiency gains achieved through higher 
amount of FDI does not seem to be pro-poor. An alternative interpretation is that the richest countries 
(those with the lowest MDPI) succeed better than the poorest countries (with the highest MDPI) do 
not to maximize the benefits of higher inflows of FDI in terms of GDP per-capita. The reason may be 
weak absorptive capabilities, for instance they lack minimum threshold stock of human capital.  
Our main findings from stochastic frontier analysis can be summarized as follows. First, very few 
financial integration variables exert an influence on the inefficiency gap. Only FDI inflows and 
remittances have significant impact on the inefficiency component of production. In many countries, 
FDI inflows contribute to reduce inefficiency, but this positive effect is not shown in the poverty 
indicators. Second, portfolio equity/debt liabilities together with FDI liabilities drive the production 
frontiers upward. However, there is a high dispersion across countries. As a consequence, international 
financial integration does not change the distribution of GDP per-capita across countries. This means 
that financial integration cannot be associated with any catch-up dynamics between the African 
countries even if FDI and portfolio equity/debt liabilities are beneficial for the poors.  
 
 
5. Quantile regression estimations 
We now investigate quantile regression as an alternative approach for estimating the role of 
financial integration on GDP per-capita efficiency. Rather than assuming homogeneous slopes across 
countries and years, we use the information in the different percentiles of the conditional distribution 
of GDP per-capita. 
Figure 8 displays the distribution of GDP per-capita for the entire sample of countries over the 
years (graph on the left). We use the Epachenikov kernel (which is optimal in a mean-square error 
sense) and also graph the normal distribution (dashed line) for purpose of comparison. The graph 
clearly shows that heterogeneity exists in the panel with bi-modality and many observations in the 
tails of the distribution. We complement this graph with a Q-Q plot (graph on the right). It shows 
substantive departure from normality (normal probability plots would be on the line). What the data 
highlight is a considerable heterogeneity across countries and time. This implies that the frontier 
estimates are likely to result in strong differences in the regression parameters of the GDP determinants 
at different quantiles. It is therefore restrictive to assume identical coefficients for countries and years. 
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Figure 8 Distribution of GDP per-capita (left) and quantile-quantile plot(right) 
Note: Solid line (Epachenikov kernel), Dashed line (Normal distribution). 
 
The literature dealing with quantile regressions has attracted considerable attention and is vast. 
The reader can refer to the handbook edited by Koenker et al. (2017) for an overview of the topics that 
have been explored in this field of research. The estimator used here is based on Machado and Santos 
Silva (2018). 
    We consider the following linear heteroscedastic model: 
𝑦 𝛼 𝑋 β 𝜎 𝛿 𝑍 γ 𝑈 ,                                        (6) 
where 𝑦 is GDP per-capita, 𝑋  is a vector of explanatory variables, 𝜎 .  is assumed to be the 
identity function (this assumption is made to keep the model tractable and amounts to restricting to a 
linear heteroscedastic specification, with 𝑃 𝛿 𝑍 γ 0 1 ). For simplicity, we also assume 
that 𝑍 =𝑋 . 𝛼  and 𝛿  are the fixed effect coefficients in the mean and variance components of the 
regression. 𝑈  is i.i.d. across i and t, and satisfies 𝑈 ⊥ 𝑋 , E 𝑈 =0, E |𝑈| =1. 
We consider the following conditional quantile function: 
𝑄 τ|𝑋 𝛼 𝛿 𝜏 𝑋 β 𝑋 γρ τ ,                                (7) 
which can be considered as a shift 𝛼 𝑋 β by the quantile of the error term distribution 𝐹 τ , 
where 𝐹 𝑦 Pr 𝑦 𝑦 and for any 0<𝜏<1, the 𝜏 quantile of y is 𝐹 τ inf 𝑦: 𝐹 𝑦 τ.  
    The function ρ τ  is defined by: 
ρ A 𝐴τ𝐼 A 0 A 1 τ 𝐼 A 0   
where 𝐼 .  is the Heaviside function. 𝛼 𝜏 𝛼 𝛿 𝜏  is the 𝜏  quantile fixed effect for 
country i and 𝛽 𝜏 𝛽 𝑋 γρ τ  as a varying slope parameter for different values of τ. 
To deal with the incident parameter problem due to the presence of the fixed effects, one can use 
a sequential estimation procedure based on method of moment quantile regressions (see Machado and 
Santos Silva (2018) for details). To estimate the production frontier, we consider the regression (6) at 
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τ=0.9. Countries positioned at the top ten percent limit of the conditional distribution of GDP per-
capita are thus considered as representing the efficient level of GDP per-capita.  
An issue that quantile regressions allow to investigate is whether a country located far from the 
efficient level of GDP per-capita can exploit the positive effects of financial integration to reduce the 
distance from the frontier. We estimate Equation (6) with the vector 𝑋  containing the same 
explanatory variable as in Tables 4. The financial integration variables are included in the list of 
regressors one by one. In our sample, four countries have their GDP per-capita level located in a 
percentile higher than or equal to τ=0.9: Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius and Seychelles. The efficient 
GDP per-capita is calculated as the average of the predicted values of the endogenous variable when 
τ=0.9, 𝑦(τ=0.9). The efficiency score are then computed as the ratio of the predicted values at other 
percentiles and at (τ=0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.8) for each pair of (country, year). We finally compute the time 
and country averages. 
Figure 9.1 shows the efficiency scores ranked by countries when the financial integration variable 
is FDI liabilities (the other graphs with other financial variables are similar to this one). The average 
efficiency scores range from 0.8 in countries like Burundi, Mozambique, and Guinea to roughly 1 for 
Tunisia, Algeria and Zambia. They seem to be heterogeneous.  
 
Figure 9.1. Efficiency scores across countries, FDI 
 
 
Figure 9.2 displays the efficiency scores across years for the regressions with different financial 
integration variables. They have a decreasing trend. Moreover, there is a remarkable variation between 
all the frontiers and the efficient GDP per-capita with ODA (this blue curve is below the others.) In 
the context of a process of catching up of living standards between the African countries, the ODA 
received from foreign countries does not play a decisive role. Figure 9.3 is a scatter plot of inefficiency 
gap versus efficient frontier for the regressions with FDI. In this case, inefficiency gap means 
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{(frontier of each country-highest frontier)/highest frontier of top 4 countries}. If a country can reduce 
an inefficiency gap and then move to the higher frontier, we can see a positive slope. In reality, we get 
a positive slope, so African countries can reduce an inefficiency gap toward a higher frontier. 
 
Figure 9.2．Efficiency scores across times, FDI 
 
 
Figure 9.3．Inefficiency gap and efficient frontier, FDI 
 
 
Figure 10 presents the estimated coefficients at all percentiles for the financial integration 
variables that were statistically significant in the regressions. We also graph the 95% confidence 
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interval. We see changes in parameter estimates when moving up to the conditional distribution of 
GDP per-capita (by moving from τ=0.1 to τ=0.9) for FDI, banks’ foreign claims and disbursements, 
while the coefficients remain roughly stable for portfolio equity/debt liabilities. ODA is not significant 
under any conditional distribution of GDP per-capita. 
Financial integration variables exercise a negative influence on GDP per-capita. The negative 
impacts of banks’ foreign claims and disbursements decrease as countries raise their GDP towards the 
efficient level, while those of FDI increase. An interesting finding is that financial integration variables 
do not exert a significant effect on GDP per-capita (0 is in the 95% confidence interval) under some 
conditional distribution of GDP per-capita: FDI at τ=0.1, portfolio equity liabilities at τ=0.1~0.4, 
portfolio debt investment at τ=0.1, 0.9, banks’ foreign claims at τ=0.1, 0.4~9, and disbursement at 
τ=0.1, 0.8~9. And this contrasts with the other quantiles. This result suggests that financial integration 
serves as a “push factor” that help the countries catching-up with those on the efficient frontier by 
managing the inefficiencies related to the “misuse” of portfolio debt, banks’ foreign claims and 
disbursements. Conversely, portfolio equity seems to serve as a “pull factor” as countries raise their 
GDP towards the efficient level. 
 
Figure 10: Estimates of financial integration coefficients across percentiles 
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Quantile regressions therefore suggest that the financial integration variables do not have enough 
effect on moving up the frontier of the most efficient country. This goes in the same direction as the 
conclusions we obtained in the stochastic frontier models where we found that the displacements of 
frontiers were incremental. Our estimates highlight the fact that, in the context of a process of catching 
up of living standards between the African countries, the ODA received from foreign countries does 
contribute “less” than the private capital inflows. For many of them face difficulties in accessing 
international capital markets, loans and grants related to official transfers often fill the financing gap. 
However, the results suggest that a kind of foreign aids does not lead to pro-poor growth. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The bulk of policy advices on financial integration recommends that the poor countries should 
open their capital account to foreign capital markets to boost their economic growth. The conditions 
under which this works have been thoroughly investigated in the literature. This paper has taken an 
alternative view, by looking at the effect of financial integration on production efficiency at the 
aggregate level. Does financial integration help a country reach its highest level of GDP per-capita? 
This question is as important as the issue of growth for the developing countries in Africa since it is 
the basis to account for countries’ living standards. 
This paper shows how observations derived from the growth literature do not necessarily extend 
to the level of GDP per-capita. First, very few financial integration variables exert an influence on the 
inefficiency gap. Only FDI inflows contribute to reduce inefficiency, but this positive effect is not 
shown in the poverty indicators. Second, portfolio equity/debt liabilities together with FDI liabilities 
drive the production frontiers upward. However, there is a high dispersion across countries. We also 
take into account the fact that the link between financial integration and GDP per-capita is a function 
with the distribution of heterogeneous characteristics of the countries. Quantile regressions are used 
with respect to parameter heterogeneity. Our findings confirm that financial integration does not have 
enough effect on moving up the frontier of the most efficient country. But again, the heterogeneity, 
i.e., difference among countries are seen. 
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Appendix: 
Table A1: List of countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N Country N Country N Country
1 Algeria 16 Egypt, Arab Rep. 31 Mozambique
2 Angola 17 Ethiopia 32 Niger
3 Benin 18 Gabon 33 Nigeria
4 Botswana 19 Gambia, The* 34 Rwanda*
5 Burkina Faso 20 Ghana 35 Senegal
6 Burundi 21 Guinea 36 Seychelles#
7 Cameroon 22 Guinea-Bissau* 37 Sierra Leone
8 Cape Verde 23 Kenya 38 South Africa
9 Central African Republic*+ 24 Lesotho 39 Sudan
10 Chad*+ 25 Madagascar 40 Swaziland(Eswatini)
11 Comoros* 26 Malawi 41 Tanzania
12 Congo, Dem. Rep. 27 Mali 42 Togo
13 Congo, Rep. 28 Mauritania*+ 43 Tunisia
14 Cote d'Ivoire 29 Mauritius 44 Uganda
15 Djibouti* 30 Morocco 45 Zambia
Note The lack of data availability: Portfolio equity and debts (*) Remittance (+)
Disbursements (#)
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Table A2. Data: Definition, category, data sources, and transformation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category Data source Definition(raw data) Tansformed data (V=raw data)
Basic determinant of production PWT Output-side real GDP at current PPPs (in mil. 2011US$) Log natural (V*1000000)
Basic determinant of production PWT Capital stock at current PPPs (in mil. 2011US$) Log natural (V*1000000)
Basic determinant of production PWT Number of persons engaged (in millions) LN Log natural (V*1000000)
Basic determinant of production PWT
Human capital index, based on years of schooling and returns to
education
V
Structural variable WDI Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) V/100
Structural variable WDI Industry, value added (% of GDP) V/100
Structural variable WDI Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) V/100
Structural variable WDI Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population) V/100
Macroeconomic policies WEO Inflation, average consumer prices Log Natural(1+V/100)
Macroeconomic policies WEO General government net lending/borrowing V/100
Macroeconomic policies PWT
Trade openness: {(csh_x: Share of merchandise exports at
current PPPs)-(csh_m: Share of merchandise imports at
current PPPs)}
V=(csh_x)-(csh_m)
Macroeconomic policies PWT
Terms of trade: Log natural{pl_x(Price level of
exports)/pl_m(Price level of imports)}
V=LN (pl_x)-LN(pl_m)
Financial development WDI Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) V/100
Financial development WDI Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) V
Governance and institutions WGI Voice and Accountability V
Governance and institutions WGI Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism V
Governance and institutions WGI Government Effectiveness V
Governance and institutions WGI Regulatory Quality V
Governance and institutions WGI Rule of Law V
Governance and institutions WGI Control of Corruption V
Financial integration EWN FDI liabilities (stock) as share of GDP V=FDI/GDP(US$)
Financial integration EWN Portfolio equity liabilities (stock) as share of GDP V=Portfolio equity/GDP(US$)
Financial integration EWN Portfolio debt liabilities (stock) as share of GDP V=Portfolio debt/GDP(US$)
Financial integration GFDD Consolidated foreign claims of BIS reporting banks to GDP(%) V/100
Financial integration WDI Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) V/100
Financial integration WDI Net ODA received (% of GNI) V/100
Financial integration WDI
Disbursements on external debt, long-term + IMF (DIS, current
US$) (% of GNI)
V=Disbursements/GNI(US$)
Note  PWT: Penn world table V. 9.0, WDI: World development indicators, WEO: World economic outlook, WGI: World Governance Indicators,
EWN: External wealth of nations by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017), GFDD : Global Financial Development Database,
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Figure A1. GDP and GDP per-capita growth 
 
Source: World Bank (2018) Atlas of Sustainable Development Goals. 
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